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ABSTRACT 
What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? 
Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This 
paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for 
approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so 
deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self-
defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, 
evolutionary approaches to epistemic justification seem to be committed to the view that our 
sensory systems and belief-formation processes are at least approximately accurate. However, 
for that reason they are vulnerable to the charge of circularity, and their success seems to be 
limited to commonsense beliefs. This paper offers an extension of evolutionary arguments by 
considering the use of external media in human cognitive processes: we suggest that the way 
humans supplement their evolved cognitive capacities with external tools may provide an 
effective way to increase the reliability of their beliefs and to counter evolved cognitive 
biases.  
 
1. The evolved mind and epistemic justification 
 
Daniel Dennett (1995) has famously compared evolutionary theory to a universal acid—a 
corrosive substance that eats its way through anything it touches, transforming every field it is 
applied to. Darwin’s idea of natural selection has the power to affect ideas far outside its 
original domain, including economics, culture, language and epistemology. Since 
evolutionary theory presents our current best hope to explain design and adaptation from a 
naturalistic point of view, it is perhaps not surprising that a growing number of philosophers 
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(e.g., Boulter, 2007; Fales, 1996; Quine, 1969; Stewart-Williams, 2005) incorporate 
evolutionary arguments in their naturalistic theories of mental content.  
The aim of this paper is to examine the implications of evolutionary epistemology for 
the epistemic justification of beliefs. The term ‘evolutionary epistemology’ will be used in a 
broad sense, namely to denote the position that biological evolutionary forces, in particular 
natural selection, are important in shaping cognition. As we shall see in section 2, 
evolutionary considerations are being used to either justify or debunk a wide variety of 
beliefs, including commonsense beliefs, religious ideas, moral judgments and scientific 
hypotheses. However, as general strategies both justification and debunking are problematic. 
The former might be subject to circular reasoning, e.g., using induction to justify induction. 
The latter is potentially self-undermining—if our cognitive faculties are deeply unreliable, 
why should we buy into evolutionary theory, which is after all a product of those same 
cognitive faculties? Section 3 reviews and extends strategies to counter the circularity charge 
leveled against evolutionary arguments. In section 4, we propose that incorporating the 
extended mind thesis in evolutionary arguments can provide a means to justify beliefs, 
especially those outside the scope of common sense. The example of temperature will 
illustrate how using external media allows humans to reach beyond their evolved cognitive 
biases.  
 
2. Cartesian God or Cartesian demon: the double-edged sword of evolution 
 
Does the fact that the human brain is a product of organic evolution give us a reason to 
believe that mental states accurately reflect the states of the world, or does it lead to a far-
reaching form of skepticism? Evolutionary approaches to the mind have given rise to two 
mutually incompatible positions. The first position, supported by evolutionary arguments 
(EAs), contends that natural selection will tend to pick out and propagate those types of 
beliefs and judgments that correspond with the state of the world. The second stance relies on 
evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). An EDA is constructed by negating at least one 
of the crucial EA premises, in particular about the relative importance of natural selection, 
and about its truth-tracking ability. Although EAs and EDAs share several premises, they 
reach contradictory conclusions. To see how they differ, let us examine the general structure 
of both arguments1.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   This formulation of EAs and EDAs is general, in order to capture the similarities and 
differences in the premises of both arguments. For an alternative formulation of EA, see 
Boulter (2007); for another rendition of EDA, see Kahane (2011).  
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Table 1: Generalized forms of EA and EDA. 
 
Note that 4* and 6* are logically independent defeaters of EA, and as we shall see, several 
EDAs only make use of one of these premises. An EDA on the basis of 4* emphasizes that 
natural selection is primarily concerned with fitness2, not with tracking truths. According to 
EAs, true beliefs are better guides to action than false beliefs, whereas EDAs that make use of 
premise 4* (e.g., Plantinga, 1993) see no reason why true beliefs would be privileged. By 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Several concepts of fitness are used in biology and in philosophy of biology (see e.g., 
Ramsey, 2006). Realized fitness tracks the actual reproductive success (number of offspring) 
of individuals within a population. Propensity fitness conceptualizes fitness as the propensity 
of an individual organism to produce a number of offspring. There can be a discrepancy 
between an organism’s propensity fitness and its realized fitness. For example, an animal can 
have beliefs that increase its propensity fitness (e.g., be properly cautious of predators) and 
yet fail to realize this high propensity fitness because it is struck by lightning before reaching 
maturity. For the purposes of this paper, we will use ‘fitness’ to mean propensity fitness.  
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contrast, an EDA based on 6* argues that natural selection is just one among many 
evolutionary forces, and there are lots of factors that may interfere with it, giving rise to non-
adaptive traits (see subsection 2.2). EDAs that make use of premise 6* (e.g., Stich, 1990) 
typically grant that natural selection can sometimes be truth-tracking, but are skeptical of its 
prominence in shaping cognition. They argue that alternative evolutionary explanations, if 
anything, are more detrimental to truth-value than explanations that invoke natural selection. 
Thus, an EDA is an argument where one or both of the crucial premises of EAs are negated. 
In order to assess the plausibility of these positions, we will now look in more detail at the 
case for EAs and EDAs, examining their scope and potential problems. 
 
2.1 Evolutionary arguments 
The wide applicability of EAs is potentially problematic, as it can lead one to replace the 
Cartesian God with natural selection. Even if we assume that there is some link between the 
truth of a belief and its adaptive value (premise 4), that beliefs are partly though indirectly 
under genetic control, and that natural selection is the primary drive of evolution (premise 6), 
the scope of EAs should be fairly restricted. EAs have been put forward to justify a wide 
range of beliefs and belief-producing mechanisms, such as the ability to make inductions 
(e.g., Quine, 1969, 126), and to draw inferences to the best explanation (Goldman, 1990). The 
most successful EAs offered to date are in the domain of commonsense beliefs. ‘Common 
sense’ refers to those types of beliefs that are obvious and self-evident to the subject, such as 
the existence of other minds, the occurrence of past events, and the reliability of perception. 
Stephen Boulter (2007) argues that these are the kinds of beliefs that are most likely to have a 
bearing on an individual’s fitness. Echoing Thomas Reid (1764), he insists that commonsense 
beliefs are crucial for our ability to act adaptively in the world. Their adaptive value provides 
evidence for their validity. Steve Stewart-Williams (2005) focuses on one particular 
commonsense belief, our robust metaphysical belief in an observer-independent world. People 
are typically not swayed by skeptical arguments that cast doubt on this belief, and even if they 
proclaim to be skeptical, in practice they still intuitively take the existence of the world to be 
self-evident. He argues that this deep metaphysical conviction has an innate basis, and that the 
best explanation for this is that the observer-independent world actually exists. In this way, 
EAs provide an answer to the radical skeptic or solipsist, who denies the existence of the 
external world: 
 
The fact that any normal mind automatically assumes an objective and mind-independent external 
world may count as proof that such a world does exist. We evolved a mind/brain that creates a sense 
of an objective, mind-independent external world because this tendency generally contributed to the 
persistence of the genetic material that gave rise to the tendency. In what kind of world would this 
tendency be biologically advantageous? It would be advantageous in a world that genuinely exists 
beyond our fleeting sensory impressions. The fact that this tendency evolved indicates that it was 
useful, and the simplest explanation for its usefulness is that it is accurate (Stewart-Williams, 2005, 
794).  
   
 Critics have often complained that EAs are inherently circular, because such arguments 
rely on a theory that is the product of human rationality to justify the rationality of our beliefs. 
Thus, a naturalized epistemology based on evolutionary theory is an inherently unstable 
position (Plantinga, 1993). We will examine two possible responses against this criticism in 
section 3. A second potential problem for EAs is that they posit that successful (fitness-
enhancing) action requires accurate beliefs. As we shall see in the next subsection, EDAs can 
cast doubt on this premise.  
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2.2 Evolutionary debunking arguments 
As argued above, EDAs attempt to undermine EAs by relying on one of two possible 
strategies (or both): they attempt to disconnect the link between the truth of a belief and its 
efficacy (4*), or they cast doubt on the shaping role of natural selection in belief formation 
(6*). We will examine both strategies in turn. Evolutionary theories of mental content propose 
that the ‘proper’ function of our cognitive processes is to promote survival and reproduction 
(e.g., Millikan, 1984). In analogy to the proper function of organs, such as the heart’s function 
of pumping blood, our cognitive apparatus guides us to perform those kinds of actions that 
enhance fitness. According to EDAs based on 4*, this should lead us to doubt the accuracy of 
our beliefs. Natural selection may, for instance, produce risk-aversive and thus error-prone 
cognitive mechanisms, as in the detection of predators (see below). Natural selection is 
concerned with fitness, i.e., a propensity to produce a greater number of surviving offspring, 
not with truth (premise 4*). Alvin Plantinga, for instance, writes:  
 
If our cognitive faculties have originated as Dawkins thinks [i.e., through natural selection], then 
their ultimate purpose or function […] will be something like survival (of individual, species, gene 
or genotype); but then it seems initially doubtful that among their functions—ultimate, proximate or 
otherwise—would be the production of true beliefs (Plantinga, 1993, 218). 
 
 Interestingly, Charles Darwin3, in a letter to William Graham, also expressed doubts 
about the justification of our beliefs based on premise 4*: 
 
With me the horrid doubt arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which have been developed 
from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the 
convictions of a monkey’s mind, if indeed there are any convictions in such a mind? (Darwin 1881).  
 
 But even if premise 4 of EA is secured, establishing a connection between fitness and 
truth-value, EDA proponents may try to undermine premise 6. Stephen Stich (1990, 56) 
points out several reasons for why the powers of natural selection are limited (premise 6*), so 
that evolution does not always produce “good approximations to optimally well-designed 
systems”: the fitting mutations may fail to arise at the right time, or pleiotropic effects4 and 
drift5 may result in cognitive mechanisms that are not fitness-enhancing. Even if the right 
mutations do occur, it is possible that natural selection gets stuck on a local peak in a fitness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  In his Descent of man, and selection in relation to sex (1871), Darwin argued that human 
mental faculties are a product of natural selection, so that his doubt must have arisen from 
premise 4* rather than 6*. 	  4	  Pleiotropy occurs when one gene influences more than one trait. This may be problematic 
for selection, because the selection for one trait might favor one specific version of the gene, 
whereas selection for another trait might favor another version of the gene. As a result, neither 
trait will be optimal.  5	   As in the case of fitness, the concept of drift has many connotations. It includes 
indiscriminate sampling, e.g., large-scale events like floods that do not discriminate between 
fitter and less fit individuals, as both types are equally likely to drown. In this example, fitness 
differences cannot explain why a particular part of the population dies in an inundation, 
whereas the other survives; it is a matter of being at the wrong spot at the wrong time. 
Another case of drift is the founder effect, where part of a population gets isolated, leading to 
the spread of an originally rare and non-fitness related trait in that subpopulation (see Walsh 
et al., 2002, for an overview).  
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landscape6 without being able to reach a better optimum. In addition, trade-offs may occur 
between utility on the one hand and expenses in time and resources on the other, resulting in 
cognitive systems that are less than reliable. Additionally, cognitive mechanisms may also 
have come about through sexual selection, i.e., through the interaction of phenotypes not with 
the environment, but with the fancy of the opposite sex (Miller, 2000). 
 Taking into account all these scenarios in which either premise 4 or premise 6 (or both) 
of EA fails to obtain, it seems that evolution has become more of a latter day Cartesian 
demon. Plantinga (1993) is perhaps best known for his radical claim that a naturalistic point 
of view is self-defeating, since evolution through natural selection is not concerned with 
tracking truths, but with increasing fitness (4*). He argues that only a supernaturalist 
ontology—where beliefs derive their warrant from the fact that cognitive capacities have been 
designed by God in such a way that they successfully aim at the truth—can provide an 
externalist justification for our beliefs. However, most EDAs are less wide in scope than 
Plantinga’s.   
 Take EDAs against religious beliefs. Empirical evidence from developmental 
psychology and cognitive science indicates that many elements of religious beliefs arise early 
in development, and are stably present across cultures, such as an overattribution of agency 
(we all see faces in the clouds, Guthrie, 1993), the belief that minds persist after death 
(Bering, 2006), and the intuition that natural objects are designed for particular purposes 
(Kelemen, 2004). What does this mean for the epistemic justification of religious beliefs? 
Researchers in the cognitive science of religion have argued that religious beliefs are 
byproducts of cognitive functions, such as agency detection and theory of mind (the ability to 
infer mental states). In his attack on religion, Richard Dawkins uses the cognitive science of 
religion literature to explain away religion as an accidental byproduct of our cognition: 
 
Religion can be seen as a by-product of the misfiring of several of these modules, for example the 
modules for forming theories of other minds, for forming coalitions, and for discriminating in 
favour of in-group members and against strangers (Dawkins, 2006, 179). 
 
But does being a byproduct by itself undermine religious beliefs? Dawkins does not tell, but if 
that were so, one could argue that science, which is also a byproduct of the evolved structure 
of human cognition, is likewise undermined.  In both cases, the trait in question would be an 
accidental byproduct of selection, not a direct product of it (6*). One can formulate a 
byproduct account of religion in a more refined way so that religion, but not other byproducts, 
is debunked. Paul Bloom (2009), for example, acknowledges that the evolutionary origins of 
religious beliefs do not provide a straightforward refutation of such beliefs. After all, 
cognitive scientists also explore why people believe that 5 + 5 = 10, and none of them come 
to doubt the validity of this outcome as a result. Nevertheless, he thinks that the cognitive 
science of religion can challenge the rationality of holding on to religious beliefs. Given that 
religion is an “evolutionary accident”, and that a plethora of mutually incompatible religious 
concepts exists across the world, believers may not be justified in holding the beliefs they do. 
Thus, it is not the evolutionary origin of religion itself, but the fact that evolved cognitive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Fitness landscapes provide a visualization of the relationship between specific genotypes 
and reproductive success; peaks represent states where genotypes achieve a high realized 
fitness. Rugged fitness landscapes have multiple peaks separated by valleys. In that situation, 
it is difficult for a particular genotype to move away from one peak to reach another, higher 
peak, because this move (crossing a valley) leads to temporary fitness costs. Organisms with a 
particular cognitive architecture may be stuck on a local, lower peak, as the costs involved in 
neural reorganization may prevent them from evolving a more efficient brain.  
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biases give rise to many incompatible beliefs, that provides a debunking argument against 
religious beliefs. Similarly, Jesse Bering (2011) argues that, while evolutionary theory does 
not disprove the existence of God, it nevertheless makes it improbable. In principle, a theist 
could argue that God instilled religious belief in humans indirectly, through natural selection, 
but “if scientific parsimony prevails […] such philosophical positioning [i.e., theistic 
evolution] becomes embarrassingly like grasping at straws” (Bering, 2011, 196). It is not the 
evolutionary origin of religious belief in itself, but its conjunction with the principle of 
parsimony that is used in a debunking argument. The case of religion indicates that 
evolutionary origins of a belief do not always constitute sufficient grounds to dispel it.  
Nonetheless, under specific circumstances, the evolutionary origins of a claim may 
negatively affect its epistemic status. Thus, EDAs might work if they provide fine-grained 
reasons for why the evolutionary origins of a particular belief might affect its epistemic 
justification. We here provide four examples of specific EDAs.  
i) Cognitive processes may sometimes err on the side of caution. If the costs or payoffs 
of false positives (detecting a signal in the environment where there is none) and false 
negatives (failing to detect a signal that is present in the environment) are asymmetric, 
natural selection will tend to promote beliefs that yield the highest payoffs or incur the 
least costs (Stephens, 2001). An example of this is agency detection: humans and other 
animals are prone to detect agency in the environment where none is present (e.g., 
mistaking wind rustling in the foliage for an approaching animal). This cognitive 
capacity generates an excess of false positives. The evolutionary rationale for this is 
that a false positive is less costly than a false negative, as the latter can result in a 
failure to detect a dangerous predator, a prey, or a potential mate, and the former only 
results in a small waste of time and energy (Guthrie, 1993).  
ii) Animals are bounded in time and space which leads to trade-offs between accuracy 
and efficiency. There is little point in carefully and elaborately choosing the best 
escape route when faced with a hungry predator.  
iii) Some cognitive illusions may be adaptive (McKay & Dennett, 2009). The belief of 
devoted parents that their own children are more beautiful, smarter and kinder than 
average (the Lake Wobegon effect) is clearly unjustified as not every child can be 
above average, but it may contribute to the time and energy parents invest in their 
children, thereby enhancing their inclusive fitness. Wenger and Fowers (2008) found 
that the majority of a sample of randomly selected biological parents of young 
children holds unrealistically positive views about their children. The parents in whom 
this illusion was most pronounced reported the highest degrees of parental satisfaction.  
iv) Intuitive beliefs that have no bearing whatsoever on fitness are invisible to natural 
selection, and are thus unreliable. After all, natural selection is the only candidate for a 
truth-tracking evolutionary mechanism, but it is of limited importance in shaping 
cognitive capacities. Next to this, we can expect that evolutionary mechanisms such as 
drift (in the meaning of stochastic processes) are even less truth tracking. Steven 
Pinker (2005) speculates that this may account for the pervasiveness of cognitive 
biases and illusions, such as the well-known conjunction fallacy7.  
EDAs of types i–iii rely on premise 4*, as they emphasize the disconnection between 
truth and fitness. By contrast, EDAs of type iv rely on premise 6*. Such EDAs typically do 
allow for some connection between the fitness and truth-value of a belief, but they are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	   In the conjunction fallacy, the probability of two conditions in conjunction (A&B) is 
regarded as (strictly) greater than that of a single one (A), which is incorrect according to 
probability theory (Kahneman et al., 1982).	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pessimistic about the extent to which natural selection shapes our belief-formation processes. 
Let us focus on the former type first. EDAs that primarily rely on premise 4* do not give us 
good reasons to believe in the cogency of scientific reasoning, since they do not guarantee any 
link between fitness and the truth-value of specific beliefs. This line of reasoning is self-
defeating. Evolutionary accounts according to which human cognitive capacities are so deeply 
biased and defective that knowledge is ruled out are self-undermining. There would be no 
good reason to assume that scientific theories are justified, or that philosophical reflection and 
argumentation (such as an EDA) provides us with sound conceptual knowledge. Also, there 
would be no reason to accept the soundness of psychological studies that indicate cognitive 
biases and heuristics. The very fact that cognitive psychologists (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982) 
are able to recognize the frailties of human reasoning, and that subjects in psychological 
experiments perform better when their errors have been pointed out to them, suggests that 
biases and heuristics are not so pervasive as to cloud our reasoning completely, and that faulty 
reasoning is often corrigible with some mental effort.   
 In the same vein, EDAs that rely on premise 6* cast doubt on any type of belief that 
has no bearing on fitness. What kinds of beliefs would we be left with? The relatively high 
reproductive success of people who are not scientifically literate (like the Amish), or who 
actively oppose some forms of scientific knowledge (such as fundamentalist Christians) 
suggests that scientific beliefs do not have much impact on fitness (Kaufmann, 2010). 
Likewise, there is little reason to expect that our ability for philosophical reflection is subject 
to natural selection. But if scientific and philosophical beliefs belong to the type of beliefs that 
have no bearing on fitness, and if EDAs indeed affect any such beliefs, then even fine-grained 
EDAs that rely on premise 6* are potentially self-defeating. After all, these EDAs themselves 
are based on scientific theories, notably evolutionary theory, and philosophical reflection. 
Thus, if we accept that everything that is not directly adaptive or fitness-enhancing will be 
affected by an EDA, then EDAs of this type will inevitably bloat out to a lot of other beliefs 
as well, undermining their own coherence and leading one to doubt the cogency of scientific 
theories and philosophical argumentation. How do we avoid this self-defeat? One plausible 
solution is that, although higher-order theories as proposed in scientific and philosophical 
practice may be fitness-neutral, the cognitive skills they are based on need not be. As David 
Papineau (2000) has suggested, selective pressures may have enhanced human capacities for 
rational reasoning in the domains of folk psychology and means-end reasoning, for example 
in our ability to discern causes. An EDA that casts doubt on the adaptive value of these basic 
cognitive capacities (premise 6*) is much less plausible. Indeed, as Evan Fales has argued, the 
probability that such elaborate neural structures as are needed for these cognitive capacities 
would have evolved without conferring any adaptive value is prima facie quite low, given 
their high biological costs: 
 
Homo sapiens has, more than any other species, specialized in intelligence as a survival strategy. 
[…] Our heavy investment in big brains and otherwise mediocre bodies makes it all the more 
unlikely that resources would be wasted on elaborate belief-forming and processing mechanisms 
that have no practical utility (Fales, 1996, 440). 
 
If evolutionary approaches to the human mind are to be coherent, they should allow at 
the very least for cognitive capacities that are capable of generating truth-tracking theories, 
such as evolutionary theory. If we accept internal coherence as an important epistemic virtue, 
it seems that EAs are more promising than EDAs in the formulation of a naturalistic theory of 
mental content, since the former are not self-undermining. Therefore, the circularity charge, 
an important challenge faced by EAs, should be addressed. In the following section, two types 
of EA are presented that attempt to avoid this circularity problem. 
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3. Responses to the circularity charge  
 
3.1 Dodging the bullet 
One possible way out of the circularity problem is simply to grant the reliability of our 
inductive capacities as given. This is an externalist position: we need not know that beliefs are 
justified, it suffices that our cognitive processes are reliable to make them justified. W.V.O. 
Quine is perhaps the best-known proponent of this naturalistic position:   
 
I am not appealing to Darwinian biology to justify induction. This would be circular, since 
biological knowledge depends on induction. Rather, I am granting the efficacy of induction, and 
then observing that Darwinian biology, if true, helps explain why induction is as efficacious as it is 
(Quine, 1975, 70).  
 
In this strategy, the epistemologist simply refuses to address the second-order question of 
whether our cognitive faculties are indeed reliable. This position is committed to scientific 
naturalism, which argues that epistemological questions should be approached through 
empirical science rather than through a priori philosophy. A weakness of this strategy is the 
problem of cheap knowledge, which is common to externalist positions in epistemology. 
Recall Plantinga’s (1993) argument: if theism is true, we can expect that God has designed the 
human mind in such a way that our cognitive capacities successfully represent true states of 
affairs. Obviously, naturalists would object to this line of reasoning, but there seems to be 
little to distinguish between the naturalistic explanation (by appeal to evolutionary theory) and 
the theistic explanation (by appeal to Christian revelation). The naturalist can appeal to the 
primacy of natural science. Since evolutionary theory is a scientific theory, it is—according to 
the naturalist—more trustworthy than skeptical philosophical arguments. Thus, naturalized 
epistemologists can take evolutionary theory to be correct, and use this theory to explain why 
our inductions are reliable. Similarly, the theist can appeal to the primacy of God as first 
cause. However, this problem of cheap knowledge might be circumvented if we consider 
naturalism not to be an a priori philosophical position, but a historical, well-established, 
though provisional, result of scientific inquiry. In contrast to supernatural accounts, 
naturalistic explanations have been consistently successful. With the efficacy of induction 
taken for granted, and bearing in mind the success of the naturalistic program in science, the 
naturalist can then argue that evolution by natural selection indeed explains induction better 
than a theistic first cause (Boudry et al., 2010).   
 
3.2 Biting the bullet 
Instead of simply refusing to address the problem of justifying our most basic 
principles of reasoning, some authors have bitten the bullet and proposed ways out of the 
circularity charge. F. John Clendinnen (1989) has argued that this part of the project of 
evolutionary epistemology will be inevitably circular, but it need not be viciously so. 
According to him, interdependence by itself is not sufficient to establish vicious circularity. 
Consider the triplet of propositions “If P then Q”, “If Q then R”, “If R then P”. Although this 
form of interdependence should make us wary, the accusation of vicious circularity holds only 
when the circle is completely closed, i.e., when we have no other reasons at all to accept any 
of the propositions involved. In a deductive model of justification, it is often incorrectly 
assumed that each step is either completely justified or not justified at all. However, it is 
possible to have an interdependence of justifications (P, Q, R) in which we start out by an 
initially very weak and provisional version of P, in which our confidence is gradually raised 
as evidence accumulates (through Q and R). In particular, Clendinnen (1989) believes that 
there are two reasons, independent from natural facts, for accepting the principle of induction 
as minimally rational: the criterion of non-arbitrariness and the principle of simplicity.  
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 Clendinnen (1989) does not believe that we can justify the whole of the scientific 
method a priori. Rather, he argues that, by starting from a minimally rational principle of 
induction, we may accumulate evidence (including evolutionary theory) that itself lends 
support to the efficacy of induction: “[i]nduction itself, once accepted as a minimal principle, 
may be used to interpret the available evidence for or against the thesis that the world is the 
kind of place in which induction is likely to succeed” (Clendinnen 1989, 468). Thus, by 
bootstrapping her way out of the circularity, the evolutionary epistemologist is able to justify 
the inferences on which her own belief in evolutionary theory hinges. 
The Bayesian epistemologist Tomoji Shogenji (2000) proposes another way out of the 
circularity problem. He argues that many forms of self-dependent justification are in fact not 
circular—rather, they are unproblematic forms of Bayesian confirmation. Standard Bayesian 
confirmation is a procedure that strengthens the subjective belief in a hypothesis H by 
observation O relative to background belief B if 
 
1. The probability of H & B is strictly positive.  
2. The probability of O given H & B is higher than the probability of O given B alone.  
 
In this general form of Bayesian confirmation, we compare Prob(O|H & B) and Prob(O|B). If 
the former is higher than the latter, we can conclude that O confirms H. Consider as an 
example empirical evidence for a scientific theory: empirical evidence supports a theory if the 
evidence is more likely to occur under the assumptions of the theory combined with our 
background beliefs than it would be under our background beliefs alone. For example, the 
unusually slow precession of Mercury’s orbit around the Sun (O) is in conflict with standard 
Newtonian mechanics (N) and our background beliefs about the physical universe (B), but 
this observation is predicted under the theory of general relativity (H). Thus, this observation 
disconfirms N, Prob(O|N&B) < Prob(O|B), and confirms H as Prob(O|H&B) > Prob(O|B).  
Self-dependent justification differs from this general form in that H plays a peculiar 
role, as it is both the hypothesis that is being tested and a part of the background beliefs. If 
there is more to background beliefs than H, one can filter H out of B to obtain B*. Thus, in 
such cases, the hypothesis is contained within the set of background beliefs but it is not 
identical to the background beliefs. To apply Bayesian confirmation to those cases, we need 
to replace B with B* & H. The first of the two conditional probabilities then becomes 
Prob(O|H & B* & H). As Prob(O|H & B* & H) = Prob(O|H & B*), the first conditional can 
be simplified as Prob(O|H & B*). In this construal, H no longer plays the split role of 
hypothesis and background belief, but rather, it plays the role of hypothesis twice in 
predicting the probability of O. As H is no longer part of the background beliefs under this 
construal, the proper second conditional becomes Prob(O|B*).  
 Shogenji (2000, 294) applies this model to evolutionary epistemology. Here H stands 
for “perceptual process P is reliable”; O represents “S believes that P is reliable”, and B* 
stands for “when it is used in empirical investigation, perceptual process P generates a belief 
in the perceiver, to which she has an introspective access to form a metabelief; her 
introspection, memory, etc., which do not depend on her perception, are reliable.” In this case, 
O (S’s belief in the reliability of her perceptual processes) does confirm H, because there is no 
reason from B* alone to assume that S’s perceptual processes would be reliable; her 
perceptual processes could generate any kind of belief, and it seems very unlikely that among 
those beliefs would be her conviction that P is reliable. On the other hand, H confers a high 
probability on those beliefs. In this way, the reliability of perceptual processes can be tested 
by simple Bayesian confirmation.  
Shogenji’s (2000) case for evolutionary epistemology could be strengthened. The case 
as he presents it relies on a theory-dependent observation O. But current evolutionary 
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approaches to the human mind frequently appeal to observations that are not dependent on 
evolutionary theory itself—of course, they are dependent on other theories, but crucially, they 
do not depend on the specific evolutionary hypotheses they set out to test. Such observations, 
which are neutral with respect to the theory that is being tested, are denoted with O* (a term 
borrowed from Adam, 2004). Over the past decades, evolutionary psychologists8 have used 
findings from neuroscience and cognitive, comparative and developmental psychology to test 
evolutionary hypotheses (see e.g., Dunbar & Barrett, 2007). Such O* types of observation do 
not assume that evolutionary theory is true, and therefore can confirm evolutionary 
hypotheses about cognition without circularity. Take, for example, the observation in 
comparative psychology that humans and monkeys are fast and accurate in their 
categorization of various kinds of stimuli. Rhesus monkeys can reliably sort pictures into food 
and nonfood categories, even if the pictures show items they are unfamiliar with (Fabre-
Thorpe et al., 1998). Moreover, they can do this in a very brief period (pictures are flashed for 
a duration of only 80 ms), and they are correct in approximately 90 % of the trials. Next to 
this, a wealth of experimental data from developmental psychology (e.g., Farroni et al., 2005) 
shows that human newborns have a visual preference for face-like stimuli. Moreover, young 
infants can recognize their own mothers from other women with similar clothes and hairstyle 
within a few hours after birth (Bushnell, 2001). These observations do not rely on the 
supposition that evolutionary theory is correct, but they do strengthen evolutionary arguments 
for the reliability of our beliefs. The categorization studies indicate that monkeys are capable 
of correctly categorizing stimuli. Their proficiency given the hypothesis that natural selection 
has endowed them with cognitive capacities that are at least truth preserving under some 
conditions is more likely than their proficiency given everything else we know about the 
physical world: the complexity of visual scenes, together with the lack of previous experience 
with the test items leads to the expectation that the monkeys would perform at chance level, 
Prob(O*|H & B*) > Prob(O*|B*). Pace Darwin’s (1881) earlier-mentioned skepticism about 
monkeys’ minds, there are indeed good reasons to trust a monkey’s convictions, at least when 
it comes to discriminating food from nonfood. Likewise, the studies with face-recognition in 
human newborns provide us with an observation that seems vastly improbable given our 
background knowledge about their lack of experience (having spent their time in the dark 
environment of the womb) and their poor visual acuity. By contrast, the observation is more 
likely if we accept an evolutionary hypothesis that proposes that humans are equipped with an 
evolved, unlearned capacity to recognize faces. Such an ability would have been adaptive for 
primates living in social groups in order to recognize each other, especially given that diurnal 
primates like ourselves have less-developed olfaction compared to most other mammals. In 
sum, circularity can be avoided by a careful rephrasing of EAs, and by reliance on 
observations outside the domain of evolutionary theory. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen 
whether non-circular EAs could be constructed for other cognitive processes, such as 
inductive inferences. After all, neuroscience and other scientific disciplines do not deliver 
brute facts, but require interpreting, cognizing minds. If these inferential processes are at 
stake, it is hard to see how one can construct a non-circular EA.  
 
4. Extended cognition and evolved cognitive biases 
 
As we have seen, EAs are most successful for commonsense beliefs. What justification can 
we get for other types of beliefs, like scientific knowledge, mathematical results, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Evolutionary psychologists examine cognitive capacities (especially those of humans) as a 
product of functional design caused by natural and sexual selection.  
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philosophical argumentation, which may be outside the grasp of natural selection—in other 
words, how can we counter premise 6* of EDAs? Additionally, how can we counter premise 
4* for cognitive capacities where we may expect that natural selection has shaped cognitive 
capacities that do not track truth? In subsection 2.2 we suggested that although scientific and 
philosophical beliefs may be fitness-neutral, this does not imply that the cognitive skills on 
which they are based would be fitness-neutral. A capacity like induction is useful in a wide 
variety of settings, not just in the context of academic reflection. Additionally, in section 3 we 
outlined several strategies that allow for self-dependent justification in EAs, and that avoid 
the circularity charge.  
 In what follows, we explore a further strategy to argue that humans can have reliable 
beliefs despite cognitive biases. We will argue that the way humans naturally supplement 
their evolved cognitive capacities with external tools may provide an effective way to increase 
the reliability of their beliefs and to counter evolved cognitive biases. Outsourcing cognitive 
tasks to the external environment enhances cognition in several ways. First, it improves 
conceptual stability. Thinking sometimes involves complex manipulations of conceptual 
structures, as in logical reasoning or carrying out large calculations. The stability of these 
manipulations (e.g., substituting a constant by another in a logical proof) is greatly enhanced 
by writing down each step (Clark, 1996; De Cruz & De Smedt, in press). Second, extending 
the mind may provide a way around evolved cognitive biases. For example, a large 
experimental literature (see Loftus, 2003, for a review) indicates that people’s episodic 
memory (i.e., biographical memory of personal experienced events) is highly constructive and 
liable to distortion. For instance, people typically remember their worst train-missing 
experience when simulating how painful and inconvenient a next train-missing experience 
will be (Morewedge et al., 2005). This puzzling feature of episodic memory can be explained 
by the hypothesis that its function is not one of disinterested representation of true events, but 
one of building simulations that guide our actions in adaptive ways. Overestimating the 
discomfort of an unpleasant experience may help us to avoid that situation in the future. 
Adaptive as this may be, it poses severe limitations on the reliability of our long-term episodic 
memories, which typically get distorted over time. Artifacts, such as books, journals, 
electronic storage devices, measuring instruments, calendars, or even simple tallies, allow us 
to store information that is cognitively challenging to memorize, and to protect it from 
memory distortion. In this way, an EDA that would call the reliability of human memory (a 
commonsense belief) into question could be countered as follows: human episodic recall may 
be biased, but humans can mitigate this by using external memory systems.  
The use of external media is not limited to contemporary societies, but seems to be a 
pervasive element of human cognition at least since the late Pleistocene (ca. 120,000-12,000 
years ago). From this period onward, archeologists find notched pieces of ochre and bone, 
shell beads and representational art, demonstrating that humans conveyed ideas externally in 
symbolic media (De Smedt & De Cruz, 2011). Kim Sterelny (2003) incorporates theories of 
niche construction in human cognitive evolution, arguing that, just as termites build their own 
environment, humans construct their own cognitive niche using artifacts to suit epistemic 
purposes. Niche construction is the process in which organisms change their own selective 
environments, thereby influencing their evolutionary history. Common examples include 
termites, beavers and ants. Members of these species build complex artifacts to ameliorate 
their environment in terms of temperature and humidity, and to provide an optimal nursery 
setting for offspring (Laland & Brown, 2006). Similarly, humans improve their environment 
by building houses, boats and other artifacts; they also improve their epistemic environment 
by designing tools to suit their cognitive purposes. If the extended mind is indeed a key 
feature of human cognitive evolution, it might be possible to justify non-commonsense beliefs 
through EAs, namely as those beliefs that reliably arise through the judicious use of external 
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media which can counter cognitive biases. Of course, the use of external tools does not 
guarantee that the beliefs acquired or stored in this way will always be reliable. It does, 
however, provide an evolutionary explanation for why humans can have knowledge that goes 
beyond their commonsense intuitions.  
 Temperature provides an interesting case study of the biases of external perception, 
and the use of external media in surmounting these. Peripheral thermoreception is the system 
that reacts to surface skin temperature. As Kathleen Akins (1996) compellingly argues, this 
system does not provide us with a reliable representation of the external world. Rather, it 
tends to produce representations that are especially conducive to an organism’s fitness. There 
are four kinds of thermoreceptors in the skin: “warm spots”, “cold spots” and two types of 
pain receptors that fire under conditions of extreme heat or cold9. The ratio between warm 
spots and cold spots is not evenly distributed across the body, for example, the lips are almost 
exclusively sensitive to warmth, and the scalp is mainly sensitive to cold. Also, the sensitivity 
of these receptors is not a linear function, and their response critically depends upon the 
starting temperature. The change from tepid to warm water, for example, elicits less response 
than that from warm to hot water. These curious properties of thermoreception can be 
explained in evolutionary terms—what is important to warm-blooded creatures like us is that 
our perception of temperature helps us to act adaptively in the world, to avoid injury, 
overheating and hypothermia. Thus, it makes sense that the human scalp is sensitive to cold, 
since excessive cooling of the brain is potentially life-threatening. The fact that 
thermoreception is concerned with an organism’s fitness, rather than with an accurate, 
disinterested rendition of temperature, makes it vulnerable to various biases. For example, if 
you place your left hand in hot water and your right hand in cold water, they will register 
different temperatures when put in the same lukewarm water. Seen from the perspective of an 
organism that has evolved mechanisms to maintain a constant body temperature, such 
illusions make sense. 
 Humans, being used to rely on external media, have come up with an elegant solution 
to the inherent biases of thermoreception: find fixed points outside of our own 
thermoreceptive experience and use these as a scale of reference for external devices that 
register temperature. Already since the 1600s, scientists who attempted to make reliable 
thermometers had a preference for observer-independent points, such as the melting point of 
butter or the boiling point of wine. Hasok Chang (2004) provides a detailed account of the 
human quest for standardized temperature measurement and of the establishment of the (to 
some extent idealized) fixed points of freezing and boiling water on the Celsius scale. To be 
sure, the fact that we place epistemic trust in such external devices does require the reliability 
of other intuitions and cognitive faculties, such as transitivity (if x is warmer than y, and y is 
warmer than z, then x is warmer than z), and a trust in the existence of general laws of nature. 
Nevertheless, relying on external measuring devices provides a solution for at least one set of 
cognitive biases, namely those of human thermoreception.  
Once humans were able to outsource their measurement of temperature to the outside 
world, they were not only able to measure temperature in a more objective way, but also in a 
much more precise fashion than if they relied on their evolved capacities alone. Interestingly, 
the practical advances in thermometry also contributed to the conceptual understanding of 
thermodynamics, such as the understanding that cold is not on an ontological par with heat, 
and the formulation of an absolute zero point. The folk intuition that cold and heat are both 
equally real phenomena may be derived from our tactile perception of temperature (the 
occurrence of cold spots and warm spots), an intuition that was countered by experiments that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  These data on thermoreception are derived from Akins (1996).  
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indicated that cold is just the absence of heat. The fact that current thermodynamics flies in 
the face of our evolved capacities for thermoreception provides at least prima facie evidence 
against a sweeping applicability of EDAs. Humans are able to surmount the biases of their 
evolved thermoreception through external tools. To put it differently: we have an intuition 
that cold really exists and there is a good evolutionary rationale for this. In spite of this, we 
can come to believe that cold is merely absence of heat—for this too, there is a good 
evolutionary explanation, namely our evolved ability to use external media in epistemic 
contexts.  
  
5. Conclusion: a defeasible evolutionary account 
 
What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? 
The development of EAs is faced with several challenges. Advocates of EDAs point out that 
there is no connection between fitness and truth-value (premise 4*) or that the force and scope 
of natural selection may be constrained for several reasons (premise 6*). In addition, EAs are 
open to the charge of circularity. We have explored venues for setting up EAs: the externalist 
solution, which uses bootstrapping by way of benign as opposed to vicious circularity and the 
use of observations that are independent from evolutionary hypotheses. Next to this, we have 
proposed that incorporating external media in human cognition provides us with a defeasible 
EA that indicates that knowledge outside of the domain of common sense is at least a prima 
facie possibility. Truth-approximating or instrumentally useful knowledge can be attained by 
reliance on external tools that are independent of human cognitive biases. Of course, 
emphasizing the role of external media in human cognition does not provide us with a 
universal, all-encompassing epistemic justification for human knowledge. What it does 
provide is a plausible reason, from an evolutionary perspective, of why humans can have 
reliable knowledge outside of domains where accurate knowledge matters for survival and 
reproduction, like, for example, scientific knowledge. As we have seen, EAs that do not 
appeal to the extended mind seem limited to the domain of commonsense knowledge. The 
role of external media in human cognition can provide an epistemic justification for some 
non-commonsense beliefs that humans entertain*.  
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